Maybe - visa.com is partially protected.

• ✓DMARC p=quarantine (partial alignment): Quarantine is a sensible middle ground that catches failures without risking delivery of legitimate mail. However, Visa hasn't set adkim or aspf to 'strict', so a spoofed email can pass DMARC if *either* SPF or DKIM alignment succeeds—not both.
• ✗SPF with ~all softfail (not -all hardfail): The SPF record lists 22 authorised sender IPs and uses ~all (softfail) rather than -all (hardfail). Softfail tells receivers 'this is probably wrong, but deliver it anyway'—which most do. An attacker sending from an unauthorised IP will still land in inboxes at many providers.
• ·DKIM at 2 selectors (s1, s2): Visa signs mail with DKIM, which is good. Finding only two selectors suggests they're using a simple key rotation pattern rather than frequent selector cycling, but the signatures themselves will still validate.
• ✗MTA-STS missing: MTA-STS enforces encrypted connections to mail servers and prevents downgrade attacks. Visa hasn't published one, so an attacker can intercept mail in transit or force unencrypted delivery without detection.

Bottom line: Visa's defences are partial: they signal intent but haven't closed the door, leaving room for convincing phishing and impersonation attacks that will slip past many recipients' filters.