Free tool · Spoofability
Can my domain be spoofed?
A clear yes / maybe / no answer instead of a wall of DMARC, SPF, and DKIM jargon. We check whether someone can send mail FROM your domain and land it in inboxes, and explain exactly which signals are holding the door open.
What this tool checks
The standard email-authentication tools dump the raw inputs at you - DMARC policy, SPF mechanism, DKIM selectors, MTA-STS mode - and leave you to assemble the answer yourself. That's useful when you already understand the model. It's unreadable when you're a non-IT person trying to figure out whether your domain is leaving the door open.
This tool computes the verdict the inputs add up to. We look at four signals:
- DMARC policy - is there a record, what does it say to do with failures (none / quarantine / reject), and is it applied to 100% of mail?
- SPF strictness - the record's terminal mechanism.
-all(hardfail) actively blocks unauthorised senders.~all(softfail) just labels them.+alltells receivers to accept anything (a misconfiguration we still see in the wild). - DKIM presence - we probe ~25 common selectors. If any returns a public key, your domain publishes DKIM and DMARC has something to align against.
- MTA-STS - related but distinct. MTA-STS prevents an attacker from intercepting your inbound mail by downgrading the connection. Doesn't change the "can I be spoofed?" answer directly but appears as a "transport leak" indicator.
Then we synthesise: YES, MAYBE, or NO. Each verdict comes with the specific signal that drove it, so you can hand the page to whoever owns DNS and they know exactly what to fix.
How to read the results
YES: no DMARC at all, or DMARC at p=none. Receivers have no policy to apply, so spoofed mail lands somewhere between inbox and spam depending on the receiver's own reputation engine - but it's not blocked. This is the default state of most domains.
MAYBE: DMARC at p=quarantine, or p=reject with pct<100, or SPF softfail without DKIM. Mailbox providers MAY quarantine or reject spoofed mail, but the rollout is incomplete. A patient attacker eventually lands one.
NO: DMARC at p=reject + pct=100, AND either SPF hardfail (-all) or DKIM publishing at least one valid key. Spoofed mail is rejected at SMTP. Your domain is not practically spoofable today.